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SUMMARY 
Traditionally, economists have not been interested in the neural underpinnings of human behavior. According to the 
classical decision-making theory, a decision-maker is a perfectly rational cognitive agent ignoring the influence of 
emotions. However, in recent years this model has been challenged by prospect theory, which identifies heuristics and 
biases that influence human choice. A recent approach known as neuroeconomics is a transdisciplinary field that tries 
to shed light on the computational and neurobiological mechanisms underlying the decision-making process, 
integrating ideas and methods from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, economics and computer science. 
Neuroeconomics gives researchers an opportunity to look into the “black box” of the human brain, which will give an 
opportunity to investigate how people make choices, how the brain calculates gains and losses, the roles of emotions 
and cognition, etc. The aim of this paper is to survey findings from the neuroeconomic literature and investigate the 
implications of this knowledge for understanding human behavior in various contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central concept of neoclassical economic 
theory is that economic man is a rational decision-
making entity who is seeking to maximize his/her own 
well-being by making consistent choices. Traditionally, 
economists have not been interested in the neural 
underpinnings of human choice. They treated human 
brain as a “black box”, believing that details about 
brain functioning would never be known. Before 
imaging technology it was impossible to measure 
subjective feelings directly and economists preferred 
indirect methods. In his The Theory of Political 
Economy William Jevons wrote: “Far be it from me to 
say that we ever shall have the means of measuring 
directly the feelings of the human heart. It is from the 
quantitative effects of the feelings that we must 
estimate their comparative amounts” (Jevons 1871, pp. 
13, 14).  
Since the second half of the 20th century the 
concepts and methods of psychology have been widely 
used in economics, since there was an increase in 
interest in the topic of how people make decisions and 
what regions of human brain are responsible for the 
decision-making process. Thus, an idea that there are 
various factors affecting decisions that are typical for 
the human nervous system gained huge importance. 
In 1990s neuroscientists proved Jevons' fallacy and 
announced that the investigation of nervous system 
gave an opportunity to measure human mind and 
feelings. In turn, these measurements help to 
understand collaboration between mind and actions and 
to develop new economic theories. Cognitive 
neuroscientists, physiologists and psychologists looked 
towards economic theory as a tool to design new 
models of choice. As a result, neuroeconomics was 
born, integrating economics, psychology, neuroscience, 
behavioral economics, biology, computer science, and 
mathematics.  
NEUROECONOMICS STUDIES 
The economics of choice can be broken down into 
two primary branches, and research in neuroeconomics 
has a similar split (Zak 2004). The first is solitary 
choice. Solitary choices are made by individuals 
without the influence of others. Such problems are 
mathematically designed as if to maximize an 
individual “utility function” that is subject to a set of 
constraints (e.g. an income–expenditure constraint, a 
time constraint, etc.). Over 300 years ago Daniel 
Bernoulli puzzled over the idea of “utility function”, 
which is the most fundamental notion in economics. 
The solitary constrained utility maximization model 
predicts an individual's behavior in impersonal 
exchange well, but fails to describe decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty. Prospect theory proposed a 
behavioral model of rational choice proving that there 
were various heuristics biasing rational behavior. 
The second branch of neuroeconomic research is 
strategic choice. Strategic choices are made by 
interacting subjects, and problems of this kind are 
mathematically designed using game theory. A game-
theoretic model of choice describes people’s behavior 
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in the game that can be affected by the information 
each has or can obtain, by the actions of each player 
and the outcomes of each strategy. This model is more 
complex than the solitary utility maximization model 
and its predictive record is more mixed. 
Research topics studied by neuroeconomists are: 
(i) identifying the neural processes involved in 
decisions in which standard economic models predict 
behavior well;  
(ii) understanding “anomalies” where the 
standard models fail (Zak 2004). 
The ultimate goal of neuroeconomics is to reveal 
the neurobiological mechanisms of the decision-
making process for better understanding human 
behavior in various contexts. 
Neuroeconomics makes a huge contribution to 
human behavior research, providing evidence about 
neural mechanisms underlying choice behavior and 
examining factors biasing rational choice, supporting 
variables, heuristics and biases introduced in 
behavioral economics, and proposing “new” variables 
ignored or missing in rational choice theory. 
In summary, economics studies human behavior 
and decision-making – both individual and collective – 
without studying the processes behind the behavior. 
Neuroscience, on the other hand, applies a huge arsenal 
of measurement techniques characterizing various 
types of behaviors. The expected benefits of 
neuroeconomics for economics are very high. 
Neuroeconomics research will allow economists to 
understand neural substrates of human behavior and 
answer fundamental questions they are unable to 
address now, such as: How does the individual make a 
choice and how is the decision utility calculated? How 
is the choice affected by emotions? Why do the stated 
preferences differ from the behavioral ones? Why does 
the same individual make different choices under the 
same conditions?  
RESEARCH TOOLS OF 
NEUROECONOMICS 
Neuroscientists use a variety of measurement 
techniques to measure the neural activity of different 
brain regions, including PET (positron emission 
topography), fMRI (functional magnetic resonance 
imaging), EEG/ERP (electroencephalogram/event 
related potentials), TMS (transcranial magnetic 
stimulation), single neuron measurement, experiments 
with humans with brain damage, psychophysical 
measurement (skin conductance, eye tracking and 
blood draws) (Zak 2004; Camerer et al. 2005).  
PET imaging was first performed on humans in the 
early 1970s. Experimental subjects are injected with a 
radioactive isotope that emits positrons (positively 
charged electrons). Subjects then lie in a ring of crystal 
detectors and a camera that captures radioactive decay 
(when a positron meets an electron they annihilate each 
other and emit gamma rays). When neurons fire they 
deplete glucose and oxygen and require increased 
blood flow to resupply these substances. Blood flows 
to neurons roughly proportionally to their firing rates. 
PET measures the accumulation of the radioactive 
tracer in brain regions; regions metabolizing glucose 
faster receive more blood flow and emit more gamma 
rays.  
fMRI was first used on humans in 1992. fMRI 
exams the amount of oxygenated to deoxygenated 
blood. Neural firing increases the demand for 
oxygenated blood (oxyhaemoglobin). Because 
deoxyhaemoglobin is paramagnetic, it produces a 
measurably larger signal relative to oxyhaemoglobin 
when perturbed by a short radio-frequency pulse. 
These differences are small and can be measured only 
in a very powerful magnet (currently fMRI scanners 
used for humans have magnets from 1 to 8 Tesla; a 1 T 
magnet is 20,000 times stronger than the magnetic field 
on the Earth’s surface). 
A new methodology for the measurement of the 
neural substrates of human social interaction is 
“hyperscanning”. Hyperscanning allows two or more 
subjects in fMRI scanners in different locations to 
interact with each other (through the internet). This 
allows researchers to see the influence of one person’s 
brain on another person’s brain (Montague et al. 2002). 
 EEGs/ERPs use scalp electrodes to measure the 
electrical activity of large groups of neurons (more than 
one million). EEGs are used clinically to help diagnose 
neurological disordersby examining the synchronicity, 
frequency and amplitude of EEG “waves” while a 
patient sits or lies down. ERPs differ from EEGs in 
thatexperimental subjects are given specific tasks to do 
that may provoke regional brain activation.  
ERPs provide higher temporal resolution than fMRI 
or PET but lower spatial resolution. The other 
advantages of ERP over fMRI or PET specified by 
neuroscientists are its relatively low cost, less 
demanding statistical analyses (two dimensional), and 
greater freedom of movement for subjects. The 
disadvantages of ERPs include low spatial resolution, 
many trials required per subject, and potential 
problems with inter-subject comparisons, taking into 
account bony landmark differences across subjects.  
Single neuron measurement requires a 
microelectrode inserted into the neuron cell body, 
which can damage or destroy it. For this reason 
animals are used for this type of measurement. Single 
neuron measurements offer the highest level of spatial 
specificity. 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is used to 
“knock out” or activate brain areas, and hence is useful 
for learning what targeted areas do.  
Studies of humans with brain damage are used to 
study the role of different brain regions in conducting 
various tasks. If a patient with specific brain region 
damage cannot perform a specific task, then that region 
is responsible for doing it.  
An old, cheap and easy technique is psychophysical 
measurement (blood pressure, skin conductance, heart 
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rate and pupil dilation, for example). These 
measurements are also portable and rapid in time. The 
disadvantage is that measurements can fluctuate for 
many reasons (e.g., body movement) and many 
different combinations of emotions lead to similar 
psychophysiological output. Eye tracking is also very 
easy and useful for economists for studying various 
tasks. Often these measurements are useful in 
combination with other measurement techniques, 
which will allow researchers to combinethe results of 
different measurements within a single experiment. 
Using pharmaceuticals in experiments is an 
important method to induce behavior, i.e. to move from 
correlation to causation, and its use in neuroeconomics 
is just beginning.  
 
BRAIN AND MODERN CORPORATION 
 
Neuroeconomists compare the human brain with a 
corporation, specifying many similarities (Sanfey et al. 
2006). From the viewpoint of the authors both brain 
and a corporation are complex systems transforming 
inputs into outputs. Both involve the interaction of 
multiple and highly similar agents (neurons are similar 
to one another, just as are people) that are specialized 
to perform particular functions. In corporations, units 
often take the form of departments performing various 
activities (e.g. research, marketing). Similarly, the 
brain consists of different subsystems specialized for 
different functions. Both are hierarchical structures. 
Both rely on “executive” systems that make judgments 
about the relative importance of tasks and decide how 
to mobilize required resources to perform those tasks. 
Several neuroimaging studies prove that brain regions 
that are responsible for executive function are engaged 
in performing new and effortful tasks; however, when 
the task becomes less effortful those brain regions 
demonstrate lower activity. Similar improvements in 
speed and efficiency are observed in industry. 
Contemporary high technologies have improved labor 
productivity in all spheres of life. Presumably, such 
improvements were accompanied by decreasing the 
role of the administrative and executive bodies, as is 
observed in the brain. 
 
MAJOR FINDINGS IN 
NEUROECONOMICS 
 
In this section major findings in the field of 
neuroeconomics are introduced such as the 
neurocomputational model of decision-making, utility 
for money, cognitive and emotional systems in 
decision-making process, neural calculation of gains 
and losses, the role of emotions, intertemporal choice, 
neural correlates of behavioral preference, 
simultaneously surveying evidence from the 
neuroeconomic literature. 
 
A. NEURAL CALCULATIONS OF 
DECISION UTILITY 
 
According to theclassical economic theory, 
economic agents are absolutely rational cognitive 
actors with consistent preferences and decision-making 
is a choice from a fixed number of alternatives that has 
the aim to maximize decision utility. In contrast, 
behavioral economists proved that revealed preference 
model was far from real-world assumptions and people 
displayed inconsistent and irrational behavior. In fact, 
the decision-making process involves three main 
components: alternatives, evaluation of the utilities of 
the alternatives, and goal realization (or non-
realization). Furthermore, three types of utilities 
underlie choice behavior: experienced utility (the way 
that the choice makes the decision-maker feel in the 
moment – either good or bad), expected utility (the 
decision-maker makes choices based upon how he/she 
expects the experiences to make him/her feel) and 
remembered utility (the decision-maker's future choices 
are based upon what he/she remembers about his/her 
past experiences) (Kahneman et al. 1999). To say that 
we know what we want, therefore, means that expected 
utility is matched by experienced utility, and 
experienced utility is reflected in remembered utility. 
Unfortunately, these three utilities rarely align. 
Neuroeconomists have designed a 
neurocomputational model of decision-making to 
investigate how expected and experienced utilities are 
computed in human brain.The keystone of the 
neurocomputational model of decision-making is the 
idea that neural system evaluates the comparative 
pleasantness of all available actions and chooses the 
one with the highest level (this process is called “the 
winner takes all”). The neural system “calculates” the 
level of pleasantness of each attainable alternative. This 
is a real physical computation that is ended by 
choosing the most preferred action. 
The neurocomputational model is founded on 
the following key principles (Fehr & Rangel 2011): 
• The brain computes a decision value signal 
for each option at the time of choice; 
• The brain computes an experienced utility 
signal at the time of consumption; 
• Choices are made by comparing decision 
values; 
• Decision values are computed by 
integrating information about the attributes associated 
with each option and their attractiveness; 
•  The computation and comparison of 
decision values is modulated by attention. 
The above-mentioned components of the 
neurocomputational model have the following main 
characteristics (Fehr & Rangel 2011): 
• Decision values are computed from the 
instant the decision process starts (for example, when a 
choice pair is displayed to a subject on a computer 
screen) to the moment the choice is made (for example, 
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when the subject indicates a choice by, say, pressing a 
button); 
• Decision values should be thought of as 
signals computed at the time of choice that forecast the 
eventual hedonic impact of taking the different options; 
• Because choices are made by computing 
and comparing decision values, these signals causally 
drive the choices that are made: options that are 
assigned a higher decision value will be more likely to 
be chosen; 
• Positive surprises increase experienced 
utility, and negative surprises decrease it; 
• Exogenous increases in the amount of 
relative attention paid to an preferable item should 
increase the probability that it is chosen. 
 
NEUROECONOMIC EVIDENCE FOR THE 
BRAIN COMPUTING DECISION UTILITY 
 
A basic assumption in economics is that each 
market transaction is a confrontation between buyer’s 
and seller’s prices. Buyer’s price (WTP – willingness 
to pay) is the maximum amount of resources that the 
buyer is ready to give up to obtain the product and 
seller’s price is the minimum amount that the seller is 
ready to accept to give up the product (WTA – 
willingness to accept). In order to evaluate whether the 
decision is beneficial or to decide how much to bid for 
an item the buyer compares WTP with the price at 
which the item is being offered. To make good trades, 
individuals must be able to assign a WTP to an item 
that is commensurate to the benefits that it will 
generate. Otherwise they would end up purchasing 
items for a price that exceeds their worth to them. 
Despite its importance little is known about how the 
brain makes these computations.In order to provide 
evidence for the existence of decision value in the 
human brainPlassmann and his colleagues carried out 
the following experiment (Plassmann et al. 
2007).Nineteen normal-weight subjects participated in 
the experiment. Subjects were asked to bid on 50 
different sweet and salty types of junk foods (e.g., 
chips and candy bars). The neural activity of 
participants' brains was measured with fMRI. 
The authors selected the foods based on pilot data 
to satisfy several characteristics: first, they wanted 
items to be highly familiar and to be sold in local 
stores, to remove uncertainty considerations from the 
WTP computation as much as possible; second, they 
wanted items to be positive for the subjects (in the 
sense that their WTP for them is greater than or equal 
to zero). The foods were presented to the subjects using 
high-resolution color pictures. Subjects placed bids for 
the right to eat a snack at the end of the experiment in 
100 different bidding trials. In each trial they were 
allowed to bid $0, $1, $2, or $3 for each food item. At 
the end of the experiment, one of those trials was 
randomly selected and only the outcome of that trial 
was implemented. In addition to a $35 participation 
fee, each subject received three $1 bills to purchase 
food during the experiment. Whatever money they did 
not spend was theirs to keep.  
The authors were sure that buyers would bid 
exactly their WTP for the item since they didn't have 
any incentive to bid less than the WTP because the 
price paid was determined randomly. They weren't 
motivated to increase the bid above the WTP because 
this might lead to paying a price larger than their WTP.  
Neuroimaging results proved that activity in the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) was correlated 
with WTP, which provides evidence for the hypothesis 
that the brain computes decision values at the time of 
choice. This finding was replicated in multiple studies 
using distinct choice objects, distinct valuation 
paradigms (price purchase decisions, binary choices) 
and distinct choice speeds (from one to several 
seconds) and the same region of the brain was 
activated, showing that brain computes decision utility 
at the time of choice. 
According to the neurocomputational model of 
decision-making, the brain computes experienced 
utility at the time of consumption. The brain computes 
the signal of experienced utility, which is the reaction 
of human organism to the consumption of the chosen 
alternative. Neuroeconomists emphasize that decision 
utilities differ from the signals of experienced utility; 
decision utility is a forecast about the experienced 
utility. 
In opposition to the idea that the experienced 
pleasantness of a product depends only on its internal 
properties, there is considerable evidence in marketing 
literature that change in the external properties of a 
product (e.g. price or package) has great influenceon 
the experienced pleasantness of the item. 
Neuroeconomists rely on the idea that experienced 
utility depends on both the nature of the item consumed 
and consumer's expectations from the consumption. 
Particularly, they are sure that positive surprises 
increase experienced utility, and negative surprises 
decrease it. 
In order to investigate the extent to which the 
pleasure derived from drinking a wine depends only on 
its physiological properties, or whether this pleasure is 
also modulated by beliefs about the price of the wine, 
Plassmann and his colleagues conducted an experiment 
(Plassmann et al. 2008). 20 normal-weight subjects 
participated in the experiment. Three different wines 
were tasted by the participants. Two of the three wines 
were administered twice, once identified by their actual 
retail price and once by a 900% markup (wine 1: $5 
real retail price, $45 fictitious price) or a 900% 
reduction (wine 2: $90 real retail price, $10 fictitious 
price). The third wine was used as a distracter and was 
identified by its retail price (wine 3: $35). The wines 
were administered in random order, simultaneously 
with the appearance of the price cue. The participants 
were asked to evaluate the pleasantness of each wine 
focusing on the flavor of the wine. Neural activity was 
measured with fMRI. 
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The main hypothesis of this study was that an 
increase in the perceived price of a wine should, 
through an increase in taste expectations, increase 
activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC). The 
results provide evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis.The authors found increased activation in 
the left mOFC and the left ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC). Activity in the mOFC was higher for 
the high-price ($45) than the low-price condition ($5) 
in spite of the fact that it was the same wine. Further 
studies showed that very weak correlation existed 
between wine taste and its price when subjects had no 
information about the price of the wine (Goldstein et 
al. 2008). 
Neuroscientific research of decision-making proves 
that attention has a great impact on consumer choice. 
In a series of experiments testing this prediction, 
Armel, Beaumel and Rangel showed that the 
willingness-to-pay for appetitive items increases 
significantly with computation time, and that the 
opposite is true for aversive items (Armel et al. 2008). 
The authors conducted the following behavioral 
experiment: 60 subjects participated in the experiment 
for choices between appetitive items and 105 for 
choices between aversive food items. 70 junk foods 
were represented as appetitive items and 35 as aversive 
items.The items appeared on the screen at random 
duration and location. The objective of the experiment 
was to investigate the influence of attention 
manipulation and long fixation on consumption 
decisions.The results of the experiment showed that 
appetitive items were 6 to 11% more likely to be 
chosen in the long fixation condition. In contrast, 
aversive items were 7% less likely to be chosen in the 
long fixation condition. 
So, this model shows that it should be possible to 
increase the probability for the item to be chosen by 
changing the relative amount of time that subjects 
fixate on the item during the decision-making process. 
Second, it predicts that the effect should be positive for 
appetitive items, and negative for aversive items. 
The results of the experiment have implications for 
decision-making in real world contexts. Marketers 
believe that consumers' attention may be manipulated 
at the point of sale. They apply various tools for 
biasing consumers' attention, for example, the package 
of the product, the location of the product on the shelf 
in supermarkets, the smell of the product, and even the 
music in the store. All these actions are partly justified 
because consumers consider only a small number of 
items in making their choice, but the actions only work 
on items that consumers consider as appetitive. 
 
B. UTILITY FOR MONEY 
The notion of utility for money is of great 
importance for economists. According to the standard 
economic model, money has no utility in itself. Its 
utility is measured indirectly by the value of the goods 
and services it can buy. This means that the pleasure 
from cars or books is different from the pleasure from 
obtaining money.  
Neural evidence suggests, however, that the same 
dopaminergic reward circuitry of the brain in the 
midbrain (mesolimbic system) is activated for a wide 
variety of different reinforcers, including attractive 
faces, funny cartoons, sports cars, drugs, and money. 
This suggests that money provides direct 
reinforcement, which means that people value money 
without taking into account what they are going to buy 
with it (Camerer et al. 2005).  
Neuroeconomists point out that since gaining 
money provides pleasure, it will be painful parting with 
it. This phenomenon helps explain why many 
companies supply their products and services in 
packages, making it impossible to calculate the price of 
each attribute in order to present them as “free”. This 
would reduce the pain of payment and motivate 
consumers. 
 
C. MULTIPLE PROCESSES IN 
DECISION MAKING 
 
Neuroscientific research of decision-making 
supports the idea that either single or dual systems 
underlie decision-making process. Existing evidence 
from neuroscience and experimental psychology 
proves that human behavior is not a product of a 
unitary process but reflects the interaction of different 
subsystems that interact and compete, inducing various 
behaviors. Despite the existing insights in these fields 
about multiple systems in decision-making, there is 
still debate about distinguishing sets of processes. 
Neuroeconomics has the potential to shed light on 
the nature of these subsystems by examining dual-
process models at a neural level. In general, these 
models propose the existence of two distinct systems. 
System 1 has been described as automatic, fast, 
effortless, unconscious, associative, slow learning, and 
emotional. System 2 has been described as controlled, 
slow, effortful, conscious, rule based, fast learning, and 
affectively neutral (Sanfey & Chang 2008).  
The interaction of System 1 and System 2 can be 
found in the example of driving a car. The novice 
driver is thought to rely on controlled processing, 
requiring more cognitive resources for various 
operations involved in the act of driving. This means 
that the driver’s behavior is defined by System 2. By 
contrast, as the level of the driver’s practice increases, 
the processes become more automatic and efficient, 
allowing the driver to be engaged in other activities, 
such as conversing with a passenger, listening to the 
radio, etc. In this case, the driver’s behavior is defined 
by -System 1. However, as soon as the experienced 
driver recognizes a problem that cannot be handled by -
System 1, such as an accident, System 2 can override 
System 1 and devote more cognitive resources to the 
situation (Sanfey et al. 2006).  
The distinction between automatic and controlled 
processes can be described as rule-based and 
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associative, rational and experimental, reflective and 
reflexive, cognitive and affective systems, “cool” and 
“hot” systems, “know” and “go” systems, fast and 
slow, or Type I and Type II processes. The main 
characteristics of controlled and automatic processes 
are described in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
Dual processing of the brain 
 
 Cognitive Affective 
Controlled processes 
• Serial 
• Effortful 
• Evoked deliberately 
• Good introspective access 
I II 
Automatic processes 
• Parallel 
• Effortless 
• Reflexive 
• No introspective access 
III IV 
Source: Camerer et al. 2005 
Cognitive and affective processes, in combination, 
define the above mentioned four quadrants. Quadrant I 
is responsible for the deliberation about purchasing 
assets, analyzing situation in the stock exchange; 
Quadrant II is in charge when actors imagine previous 
emotional experiences so as to actually experience 
those emotions during a performance; Quadrant III 
governs the movement of your hand when you take a 
cup; and Quadrant IV makes you jump when 
somebody says “Boo!” 
Neuroscientists’ studies of neural components of 
automatic and controlled processes show what brain 
regions are responsible for cognitive and emotional 
systems. Frontal parts of the brain are responsible for 
controlled processes. The prefrontal cortex (pFC) is 
sometimes called the “executive” region, because it 
draws inputs from almost all other regions, integrates 
them to form near and long-term goals, and plans 
actions that take these goals into account (Shallice et 
al. 1996). Regions that support cognitive automatic 
activity are concentrated in the back, top and sideparts 
of the brain. 
Distinguishing between cognitive and emotional 
systems could help to shed light on many fundamental 
economic patterns, such as asymmetric responses to 
gains and losses (loss aversion), decisions over time, 
and fairness vs. unfairness considerations.   
 
D. NEURAL CALCULATIONS OF 
GAINS AND LOSSES 
 
The question of how the brain calculates gains and 
losses is perhaps the most hotly debated topic in 
neuroeconomics. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
formalized the notion of loss aversion, which implies 
that people are twice more sensitive to losses than to 
corresponding gains. Their famous dictum explains 
loss aversion in risky choices and the endowment 
effect (Thaler 1980) in riskless choices. The 
endowment effect is a tendency for people to value an 
item higher when they possess it than they would value 
the same item if they did not own it. This phenomenon 
also describes the difference between buying and 
selling prices or willingness to pay and willingness to 
accept. 
One fundamental question for the study of decision 
making is whether loss aversion is a product of a single 
system or reflects the engagement of distinct emotional 
processes within the brain when potential losses are 
considered. Some neuroscientists insist that higher 
sensitivity to losses is driven by negative emotions 
such as fear or anxiety, which means that loss aversion 
is explained by a single system that evaluates gains and 
losses asymmetrically. This notion predicts that higher 
sensitivity to increasing potential losses should be 
associated with greater activity in brain regions that are 
responsible for negative emotions in decision making 
(such as the amygdala or anterior insula). Alternatively, 
loss aversion could reflect an asymmetric response to 
losses versus gains within a single system that codes 
for the subjective value of the potential gamble, such as 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC)/orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) and ventral striatum (Tom et al. 2007).   
To investigate whether gains and losses are coded 
by the same brain regions, Tom et al. (2007) conducted 
an experiment collecting functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) data while participants (16 
healthy subjects) decided whether to accept or reject 
mixed gambles that offered a 50/50 chance of either 
gaining one amount of money or losing another 
amount, with gains ranging from $10 to $40 (in 
increments of $2) and losses ranging from $5 to $20 (in 
increments of $1). They chose these ranges because 
Kahneman and Tversky's studies showed that people 
are twice more sensitive to losses than to 
corresponding gains (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The 
participants were given $30 a week before scanning 
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and one decision from each of three scanning sessions 
was honored for real money. To encourage participants 
to reflect on the subjective attractiveness of each 
gamble rather than to rely on a fixed decision rule, the 
authors asked them to indicate one of four responses to 
each gamble (strongly accept, weakly accept, weakly 
reject, and strongly reject).  
The results of the experiment showed that a group 
of brain regions including the striatum, ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, ventral anterior cingulate cortex and 
medial orbitofrontal cortex, which code for the 
subjective value of the potential gamble, showed 
increasing activity for gains and decreasing activity for 
losses. There were no regions that showed decreasing 
activation as gains increased. If loss aversion is driven 
by a negative affective response (e.g., fear, vigilance, 
discomfort), then one would expect increasing activity 
in brain regions associated with these emotions as the 
size of the potential loss increases. Contrary to this 
prediction, no brain regions showed significantly 
increasing activation during evaluation of gambles as 
the size of the potential loss increased (averaging over 
all levels of gain). 
Examination of regions of interest in the striatum 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex from the gain/loss 
conjunction analysis revealed that these regions 
exhibited a pattern of “neural loss aversion”; that is, the 
(negative) slope of the decrease in activity for 
increasing losses was greater than the slope of the 
increase in activity for increasing gains in a majority of 
participants. So the authors proved that losses and 
gains are coded by the same brain regions. 
 
E. THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS 
Until recently, economists have ignored the role of 
emotions in judgment and decision making. Emotion 
was viewed only as a negative influence deviating 
human behavior from the rational choice model. 
However, some researchers stress the importance of 
environmental, social, and emotional influences on 
decision making, and recently neuroeconomists have 
begun to examine the influence of emotions on human 
behavior using neuroimaging techniques, especially the 
relative contributions of cognitive and emotional 
processes to human social decision-making. An 
example of the latter is behavior in an often-studied 
decision task known as the Ultimatum Game. 
In this game, participants are given the opportunity 
to divide a sum of money between them. One player is 
the proposer and the other, the responder. The proposer 
makes an offer as to how this money should be split 
between the two. The responder must decide either to 
accept or reject an offer of money. If the offer is 
rejected, then neither player receives anything, if it is 
accepted, the money is split as proposed. According to 
standard economic models the responder must accept 
even the smallest sum of money, because some money 
is better than none. However, behavioral studies 
indicate that about half of the unfair offers are rejected.  
For many years behavioral economists have been 
seeking to investigate the reasons for turning down 
monetary rewards in the ultimatum game. They are 
sure that the game is too simple for participants to fail 
to understand the rules. This means that something is 
hidden in the human brain that leads people to punish 
the partner for an unfair offer. 
To shed light on the neural and psychological 
processes underlying such behavior, and to provide 
evidence for the emotional processes of economic 
decision-making in the ultimatum game, Sanfey and 
his colleagues conducted the following neuroimaging 
experiment (Sanfey et al. 2003). They scanned 19 
participants using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), each of them in the role of the 
responder in the ultimatum game. Before scanning, 
each participant was introduced to 10 people they were 
told would be partners with them in the games. They 
played a single game with each partner. The 
participants were then placed inside the MRI scanner 
and began playing the ultimatum game with their 
partners via a computer interface. They completed 30 
rounds in all, 10 rounds with a human partner (once 
with each of the 10 partners), 10 with a computer 
partner, and a further 10 control rounds in which they 
simply received money for a button press. The rounds 
were presented randomly, and all involved splitting 
$10. Half of these offers were fair ($5:$5), the 
remaining half were unfair splits (two offers of $9:$1, 
two offers of $8:$2, and one offer of $7:$3). The 10 
offers from the computer partner were identical to 
those from the human partners (half fair, half unfair). 
The 10 control trials were designed to control for the 
response to monetary reinforcement, independent of 
the social interaction.  
Participants accepted all fair offers, with decreasing 
acceptance rates as the offers became less fair. Unfair 
offers of $2 and $1 made by human partners were 
rejected at a significantly higher rate than those offers 
made by a computer, suggesting that participants had a 
stronger emotional reaction to unfair offers from 
humans than to the same offers from a computer. 
Seeking to investigate neural and behavioral reactions 
to offers, the authors hypothesized that unfair offers 
would engage neural structures involved in both 
emotional and cognitive processing, and that the 
magnitude of activation in these structures might 
explain variance in the subsequent decision to accept or 
reject these offers.  
The results of neuroimaging experiment showed 
that a group of brain regions including the bilateral 
anterior insula (connected with negative emotional 
states, particularly anger and disgust), dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (the DLPFC is linked to cognitive 
processes) and anterior cingulate cortex (the ACC is 
implicated in detection of cognitive conflict) showed 
greater activity for unfair offers compared with fair 
offers. The study found that if the insular activation 
was greater than the DLPFC activation, participants 
tended to reject the offer, whereas if the DLPFC 
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activation was greater, they tended to accept the offer. 
This offers neural evidence for atwo-system account of 
decision-making in this task. 
Regions of bilateral anterior insula demonstrated 
higher activity for a $9:$1 offer than an $8:$2 offer, in 
addition, the results of the study showed greater 
activation of this region for unfair offers than for fair 
($5:$5) offers. Indeed, the participants with stronger 
anterior insula activation to unfair offers rejected a 
higher proportion of these offers.  
The authors concluded that the activation of 
DLPFC is connected with participants’ money 
maximization goal and did not correlate with the 
acceptance rates, proving that emotional and cognitive 
systems compete, inducing accepting or rejecting 
behavior. The study showed that rejected unfair offers 
had greater activation in the anterior insula than in the 
DLPFC, and in the case of unfair offers the DLPFC 
demonstrated higher activation than the anterior insula. 
As mentioned above, the experiment showed that 
unfair offers were also associated with increased 
activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which 
is responsible for cognitive conflictbetween cognitive 
and emotional systems. 
Their investigation of neural correlates of cognitive 
and emotional processes helps to explain the basic 
sense of fair and unfair behaviors, which is a very 
important aspect in economic, ethical, moral, and 
social policy, and in other contexts.  
 
F. DECISIONS OVER TIME 
Investigations of cognition-emotion interaction help 
to shed light on the notion of gratification delay. 
According to the discounted utility theory, people 
discount all utilities and all types of goods and services 
at a constant rate. However, research on time 
discounting shows that gains are discounted more than 
losses, small amounts are discounted more than large 
amounts, greater discounting is shown to avoid delay 
of a good than to expedite its receipt, improving 
sequences are often preferred to declining sequences, 
violations of independence are pervasive,  and people 
prefer spreading consumption (Frederick et al. 2002). 
One hypothesis that has been advanced to explain 
this phenomenon is that inter-temporal choice can be 
viewed as a splice of two processes—an impulsive, 
affective process and a more far-sighted process guided 
by the prefrontal cortex (Shefrin & Thaler 1988). 
Alternatively, an affective system makes individuals 
display myopic behavior, and a cognitive system 
makes them take into account long-term consequences 
of actions. Examination of cognitive and affective 
processes in the brain will help to better understand 
inter-temporal choice behavior. 
McClure et al. (2004a) carried out an experiment to 
provide support for this phenomenon. 14 subjects 
participated in the experiment. Participants made a 
series of binary choices between smaller/earlier and 
larger/later money amounts while their brains were 
scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
The specific amounts (ranging from $5 to $40) and 
times of availability (ranging from the day of the 
experiment to 6 weeks later) varied across choices. At 
the end of the experiment, one of the participant’s 
choices was randomly selected to count. The authors 
found that the options involving immediate rewards 
activated parts of the limbic system (affective), and 
regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex and posterior 
parietal cortex—typically viewed as more cognitive 
regions—were engaged uniformly by inter-
temporalchoices irrespectiveof delay. So, during the 
competition between cognitive and affective systems 
comparative advantage of one or the other process will 
cause the participant to behave less or more 
impulsively. 
 
G. NEURAL CORRELATES OF 
BEHAVIORAL PREFERENCE  
 
According to neoclassical theory, people behave 
consistently and human preferences are constant: once 
they have revealed that they prefer A to B, people 
should not subsequently choose B over A. Behavioral 
economists proved that the revealed preference model 
did not describe real-world choices because there 
weremany factors biasing human preferences. 
Behavioral preferences often deviate from statedones. 
It is well-known that chief among the factors 
affecting people's preferences is brand knowledge. One 
of the most interesting examples showing the influence 
of brand knowledge on choice is the “Pepsi challenge”. 
That is, a taste test run by PepsiCo to show consumers' 
preferences between Pepsi and Coca-Cola. 
Neuroeconomic research of neural correlates of 
behavioral preferences will help to explain this 
phenomenon. 
In order to investigate the influence of brand 
knowledge on people’s preferences McClure et al. 
(2004b) conducted an experiment with subjects 
preferring Coke or Pepsi. Authors explain that these 
two drinks were chosen for three reasons. First, they 
are culturally familiar to subjects. Second, they are 
both primarily composed of brown, carbonated sugar 
water, and sugar water serves as a primary reward in 
many human and animal experiments. Third, despite 
their similarities, they generate a large subjective 
preference difference across human subjects. 
A total of 67 subjects participated in the study. For 
the first, subjects were asked which drink they 
preferred: Coke, Pepsi or no preference? Their answers 
were referred to as their stated preferences. Next, while 
being scanned with fMRI subjects engaged in taste 
tests: anonymous, semi-anonymous Coke and semi-
anonymous Pepsi. 
During the anonymous taste test participants chose 
between two unmarked cups, one of which contained 
Coke and the other contained Pepsi. During the semi-
anonymous Coke taste test participants chose between 
two cups, one of which was labeled as Coke and the 
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other was unmarked and could contain either Coke or 
Pepsi. During the semi-anonymous Pepsi taste test 
participants chose between two cups, one of which 
contained Pepsi and the other containing either Coke or 
Pepsi. 
Data collected from anonymous taste test supported 
the idea that stated preferences are not correlated with 
behavioral preferences. There was no difference 
between stated and behavioral preferences but there 
was no significant statistical correlation between these 
two preferences. 
In order to test whether brand knowledge biases 
consumers' preferences, the authors conducted semi-
anonymous tests.During semi-anonymous Coke taste 
test participants showed a strong bias in favor of the 
labeled cup. The Coke label had a bigger effect in 
biasing subjects' preferences than the Pepsi 
label.During semi-anonymous Pepsi taste test the 
existence of the Pepsi label did not change the 
distribution of choices significantly compared to the 
anonymous test. In the case of the semi-anonymous 
Coke test the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 
showed great activity, which is not true for the Pepsi 
test. Thus, the authors conclude that brand knowledge 
has truly different responses both in terms of affecting 
behavioral preference and in terms of modifying brain 
responses. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The question of how we make decisions is a field of 
interest for philosophers, sociologists, economists, 
psychologists, and neuroscientists. In classical 
decision-making theory, an economic agent was 
viewed as a rational agent who was able to estimate the 
probabilistic outcomes of uncertain decisions and 
choose the alternative that maximized his/her utility. 
However, this model was not able to predict human 
behavior accurately. 
The birth of neuroeconomics as an interdisciplinary 
field of science, combining theories and methods from 
neuroscience, economics, psychology and computer 
science, was a sharp turn in economic thought and 
fundamentally changed the way economics is done. 
The methods of neuroscience have allowed 
neuroeconomists to reveal some of the most important 
issues in economics, including: Why do people 
consume and save? How does an individual make 
choices under risk and uncertainty? How are decision 
values and decision utilities calculated in the brain? 
How are gains and losses evaluated? How are 
individuals preferences defined? How do the emotions 
affect decision-making process? Neuroeconomics 
provides the necessary tools to measure 
neurophysiological activity of the brain during the 
process of choice and opens a window into human 
nature. So we may conclude, that the long-term goal of 
neuroeconomic research is to shed light on the 
neurobiology of decision-making, which will 
contribute to the development of a new choice model 
with higher levels of predictive power. 
Neuroeconomics is sometimes criticized as not 
being able to transform economics, since brain activity 
is not a field of interest for economics. Besides, critics 
of laboratory research often reject the ideat hat studies 
in which participants must remain almost perfectly still 
inside multi-ton magnets will demonstrate real world 
situations. Colander (2007) reminds these critics that 
classical economists were interested in measuring 
utility directly. He mentions that Edgeworth dreamed 
of a “hedonimeter” that could measure the utility of 
each person, while later Ramsey fantasized about a 
“psychogalvanometer”. This means that the main 
reason for the classical economists to focus on the 
utility maximization model of rational choice was not 
the lack of interest in examining the brain but the lack 
of brain measurement tools. 
However, neuroeconomists are convinced that 
investigating the activity of different brain regions 
during various tasks and understanding collaboration 
and competition between the regions will help to solve 
economic problems not observed before. They believe 
that their future is bright. 
In this respect Daniel Kahneman says,“It is 
far easier to argue for mindless economics than for 
brainless economics” (Datta 2011, p. 305). 
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